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THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY IN A GOOD SOCIETY
Randy E. Barnett*
and
DouglasB. Rasmussen* *
INTRODUCTION

We have been asked to consider how a "Constitution of Civic
Virtue" might contribute to a "good society." To answer this
question, we need to have some idea of what a good society might be,
and we need to be able to articulate that idea. Certainly, we think we
know a good movie when we see it, a good book when we read it, a
good argument when we hear it, and a good idea when we have one,
but we are not sure we have a handle on what a good society is. Even
what we think we know about good books, movies, arguments, and
ideas gives us pause. For we are not sure we can always explain why
we think a particular movie is good or a book is bad. And even when
we can explain it, we find that many people disagree with us about
such matters. Indeed, we, at times, even disagree with each other.
By this we do not mean to suggest any skepticism about there being
such a thing as a good book, a good film, a good wine, a good car, or
even a good person. If there is one thing we think we know in this
world, it is that there are good persons-quite amazingly good
actually. Nor do we mean to deny that there may be such a thing as a
good society, though we are not so confident about this. A lot
depends on what is meant by those words. Having said this, we will
set our skepticism aside and now offer a conception of a good society;
but we no more expect everyone to agree with this conception then
we expect them to agree with one of us that "The Tao of Steve" was a
really good movie.
I. DISTINGUISHING SOCIETY FROM COMMUNITY

Let us begin by distinguishing a "society" from a "community." A
society, or what F. A. Hayek referred to as the Great Society, is a vast
network of human interaction. The people within such a network
know an infinitesimal fraction of their fellow network members.
99.999999% of them are strangers to each other, yet they are highly
Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law, rbarnett@bu.edu.
** Professor of Philosophy, St. John's University, dbrlogos@ earthlink.net.
*
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dependent on each other for almost every necessity and luxury of life,
from food and shelter to every imaginable consumer product. They
are also dependent on the society to refrain from interfering with their
pursuit of happiness or the good life.
The network that constitutes a society is so large and amorphous
that it is impossible to speak of an individual's consent to be a
member and live by the rules established by the government of any
given society. The only way to refuse consent to being a member of a
particular society is to leave. Such a choice is so costly in terms of
what one gives up by leaving-one's family, friends, home,
community, career, language, etc.-that a decision to remain cannot
be construed as consent to live by whatever government happens to
exist in that society. This is particularly so, because the option of
living in no society at all is almost impossible to exercise.
For those that think otherwise about consenting to be a member of
a particular society, ask yourself what you would think constitutes
consent to waive tort liability, or even consent to lease a television set
at a high interest rate. Then apply those standards to the decision to
remain in the country of one's birth, and we suggest you would not
infer from that decision consent to live by the rules of any particular
regime.
In contrast, a "community" is a network of interaction in which
each person has exercised his consent to live by the rules of that
network-both the primary rules that govern behavior and the
secondary rules that determine how the primary rules are to be made.
While living in the same Great Society, we are all members of
countless different communities. This includes such temporary
communities as, for example, a conference on a constitution of the
good society, as well as the more lasting communities of our home
institutions, our churches or synagogues, our clubs, and for some the
co-ops, condominiums, and residential developments in which they
live. One might say that the precise composition of each of our
community memberships is as unique as our other personal
characteristics.
Each of the communities to which we belong is marked by a
meaningful and very real, unanimous consent to live by the primary
and secondary rules of that community-a consent that the Great
Society cannot claim.1 Typically, with genuine communities consent is
1. By viewing the Great Society as a network it is tempting to look to the
Internet as an analogy or model. But there is one big difference. You do in fact
choose to use the Internet. You can turn it off and walk away from it at reasonably
low cost. But you cannot refuse to "use" the society of which you are a part-unless
you go to very great extremes indeed and even the success of such efforts at complete
detachment are open to question. If you cannot withdraw from society even if you
want to, then unlike the Internet it cannot be said that you choose or consent to be a
member of society (though you can at great cost leave and become a member of
another). The Internet is actually more like the telephone network than either a
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express, but on certain conditions which we shall not go into here,
consent to the governance of a genuine community may be implied-infact.
We realize that not everyone uses these terms in this manner. Some
look to what we are calling a Great Society and see it as a community.
We think this is mistaken, but at the moment we are just trying to
clarify the terminology so we can interpret the question before us. We
take the reference to a "good society" in the tide of this symposium to
be a reference, not to the many communities to which we consent to
belong, but to the Great Society-that is to say, to the vast network of
human interaction that used to be identified primarily with nationstates, but the precise demarcation of which is becoming increasingly
blurry now that technology is expanding the boundaries of human
interaction.
II. WHAT MAKES A SOCIETY GOOD?: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN
ANSWER

What is it, then, that makes a Great Society, as distinguished from a
community, a "good" society? Initially, we would say that a Great
Society is good if it has a framework in which human beings can
pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in close proximity
to each other. It provides a framework, not for isolated individuals,
but for individuals who are actively and continuously interacting with
each other by partaking in myriad forms of community that must
somehow peacefully coexist if persons are to pursue happiness, peace,
and prosperity.
In The Structure of Liberty, it was explained how any society must
solve the serious problems of knowledge, interest, and power, if the
persons that comprise society are to pursue happiness. And the
solution to these social problems lies, in part, in the legal recognition
of the fundamental natural rights of property, freedom of contract,
first possession, self-defense, and restitution.
In The Structure of Liberty, however, it was taken for granted that
the pursuit of happiness (and peace and prosperity) were the goals of
any society. Some have asked, "why should this be?" Others have
wanted to know more about what exactly is meant by the pursuit of
happiness. They want to assess more carefully the claim that these
rights are fundamental to the pursuit of happiness. These are very
complicated issues, but we believe that any answer to these questions
must be based upon a conception of the human good-that is, on a
conception of what it really is for human beings to flourish. We take a
neo-Aristotelian approach.
society or a community.
2. See Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law
(1998) [hereinafter Barnett, The Structure of Liberty].
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According to this approach, there are six fundamental features of
the human good. The good for humans is (1) objective, (2) inclusive,
(3) individualized, (4) agent-relative, (5) self-directed, and (6) social.
We shall briefly describe each of these features. This description,
however, will be highly truncated.3 We offer it only to give a flavor of
the nuanced and complex character of this neo-Aristotelian account.
(1) Human flourishing is a way of living that consists of certain
activities. Human flourishing is to be found in action. It is not
something static. These activities both express and produce in human
beings an actualization of their generic and individual potentialities.
According to this approach, human goodness is a state of being, not a
mere feeling or experience. Whether or not anyone is flourishing is a
fact independent of their opinion about whether they are flourishing.
It is an objective good.
(2) Human flourishing is an "inclusive" end. It comprises basic or
"generic" goods and virtues-for example, such goods as knowledge,
health, friendship, creative achievement, beauty, and pleasure; and
such virtues as integrity, temperance, courage and justice. Just as
buying golf clubs is a means to playing golf, while putting is part of
what constitutes the activity of golf itself, the subordinate goods and
virtues are valuable not as mere means to human flourishing but as
partial realizations or expressions of it. Though human flourishing is
constituted by many subordinate goods and virtues, there is not a
preset weighting or evaluative pattern for the basic or generic goods
and virtues that constitute it. Even if all the aforementioned goods
and virtues are necessary to flourishing, an abstract analysis of human
nature may not show us what their evaluative ranking should be. Such
an analysis may not tell us how much time and effort should be spent
in pursuit of one necessary good or virtue as opposed to another.
(3) Human flourishing is individualized and diverse. Abstractly
considered, we can speak of human flourishing and of basic or generic
goods and virtues that help to define it. Yet this does not make
human flourishing in reality either abstract or universal. Concretely
speaking, no two cases of human flourishing are the same, and they
are not interchangeable.
Just as Susan's actualization of her
potentialities is not the same as Fred's actualization of his, Susan's
3. This portion of our essay is based on material from the following: Douglas B.
Rasmussen & Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberalism Defended: The Challenge of PostModernity 23-39 (The Locke Inst., The Shaftesbury Papers No. 9, 1997) [hereinafter
Rasmussen & Den Uyl, Liberalism Defended]; Douglas B. Rasmussen & Douglas J.
Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order 58-75, 131-54
(1991) [hereinafter Rasmussen & Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature]; Douglas J. Den Uyl

& Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Rights" as MetaNormative Principles,in Liberty for the

Twenty-First Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought 59 (Tibor R. Machan &
Douglas B. Rasmussen eds., 1995) [hereinafter Den Uyl & Rasmussen, "Rights" as
Meta-Normative Principles];see also Douglas B. Rasmussen, Human Flourishingand
the Appeal of Human Nature, 16 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 1 (Winter 1999).
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fulfillment is not the same as Fred's. Human fulfillment is always
something unique.
(4) Human flourishing is agent-relative.4 The status of human
flourishing as the ultimate value arises within and obtains only in
relationship to some person's life. That is to say, its value is found in
and exhausted by those activities of a person that constitute that
person's flourishing. This view stands in contrast to those ethical
theories that view values as "impersonal" 5 such that they can be
conceptually detached from particular persons, aggregated and then
maximized across persons. Human flourishing is not something that
can be exchanged or promoted regardless of whose flourishing it is.
(5) Human flourishing is self-directed activity. Human flourishing
must be attained through a person's own efforts and cannot be the
result of factors that are beyond one's control. Flourishing does not
consist of the mere possession and use of needed goods. Rather,
human flourishing consists in a person's taking charge of his own life
so as to develop and maintain those virtues for which he alone is
responsible and which in most cases will allow him to attain the good
his life requires. Self-direction is not merely one of many necessary
conditions of human flourishing. Rather, self-direction is necessary to
the very character of human flourishing. Human flourishing would
not be human flourishing if there was no self-direction involved.
Moreover, self-direction is the central necessary constituent or
ingredient of human flourishing without which no other feature could
be a constituent. Regardless of the level of achievement or specificity,
self-direction is a feature of all acts of human fulfillment. To flourish,
each person must expend effort to discover the goods and virtues of
human flourishing as well as to achieve and implement them.
(6) Human beings are naturally social animals. We are social in the
sense that our maturation requires a life with others. We have
potentialities that are other-oriented, and we cannot find fulfillment
without their actualization. Human flourishing is not atomistic.
Therefore, one who thinks that human beings can flourish
independently and apart from others commits the fallacy of reification
4. Human flourishing, G, for a person, P, is agent-relative if and only if its distinctive

presence in world W1 is a basis for P ranking W1 over W2, even though G may not be
the basis for any other persons ranking W1 over W2. See Eric Mack, MoralIndividualism,
Agent-Relativity and DeonticRestraints,7 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 81 (Autumn 1989).
5. An ethical theory is impersonal when all ultimately morally salient values,
reasons, and rankings are "agent-neutral," and they are agent-neutral when they do
not involve as part of their description an essential reference to the person for whom
the value or reason exists or the ranking is correct. "For any value, reason or ranking
V, if a person P1 is justified in holding V, then so are P2-Pn under appropriately

similar conditions.... On an agent-neutral conception it is impossible to weight more
heavily or at all, V, simply because it is one's own value." Douglas J. Den Uyl, The
Virtue of Prudence 27 (1991). Accordingly, in an impersonal ethical theory, when it
comes to describing a value, reason, or ranking, it does not ethically matter whose

value, reason, or ranking it is.
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just as much as one who thinks that human nature or society can exist
independently and apart from individuals. Being asocial is not a policy
consistent with human flourishing, and individuals ought to be
concerned with the nature of, and conditions for, social life.
Accordingly, it can be said that one person's moral well-being
cannot be exchanged with another's. The good-for-me is not, and
cannot be, the good-for-you, but this is not to say that any choice one
makes is as good as the next. Rather, it is to say that the choice must
be one's own and must involve considerations that are unique to
oneself. The human good, then, is something objective, self-directed,
socially achieved, and yet highly personal. It is not abstract,
collectively determined, atomistic, or impersonal.
What constitutes flourishing for a particular person is "objective"
insofar as it is not merely a matter of that person's will or desire or
opinion, or social convention. A person can be quite sure about how
he or she may flourish and yet be entirely wrong. But what
constitutes flourishing is also profoundly individual (or "subjective")
and is thus always diverse (or pluralistic) insofar as each of the
abstract "goods" and "virtues" will apply differently to each particular
individual.
Moreover, this neo-Aristotelian account of the human good as
flourishing is fundamentally egalitarian in the sense that it provides no
impersonal reason to prefer one form of flourishing to another. As
our mentor Henry B. Veatch once pointed out, each of us must pursue
our own respective forms of self-perfection,6 and it must be in terms of
self-perfection that we make sense of good society or, more precisely,
the good political/legal order of the Great Society.
Considering that the list of abstract goods and virtues that is
subordinate to the end of human flourishing is long, and that there are
several billion people in the world, each of whom has a different
package of such goods, it is impossible, we suggest, to specify any
political or legal system that can ensure human flourishing for
everyone. To put the matter baldly, it is impossible to imagine a law
that could be enacted that would ensure the flourishing of even a
single person, much less the 250 million persons that live in the area
known as the United States.
Why is this? Partly it is because of the serious knowledge problem
involved: if each person cannot be sure what it takes for him or her to
flourish, it would be much more difficult for remote rulers to know
what it would take for millions of persons unknown to them to
flourish. Partly it is because of the serious problems of interest
involved: assuming such knowledge of the requirements of flourishing
for others truly existed, what assurances do we have that enacted laws
will truly reflect those requirements.
6. Henry B. Veatch, Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? 84-85 (1985).
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Yet, it is even more than this. Human flourishing can only be real,
can only be something that is valuable, when it is the good for some
person. For this to occur, it has to be more than an abstraction. It
must obtain its particular form or character by being melded with the
unique features of the person. In other words, the basic or generic
goods must be given appropriate weight and proportion-we must act
in accordance with our "means"-but this requires that we exercise
the central intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Yet, what has not
always been recognized is that the virtue of practical wisdom can only
occur through human agency or self-direction. Because human
flourishing is and must be a self-directed activity, lawmakers can no
more provide the basis for human flourishing than they can provide
the basis for empathy and compassion, or even for physical fitness.
But this is not to say that a legal order is unimportant for human
flourishing. Far from it. It is only to say that it is a mistake to think of
a political or legal order as one that can ensure or guarantee that
anyone, much less everyone, actually flourishes, for such guarantees
are impossible given the nature of human beings and the world in
which we live. Though a political or legal order cannot be the means
by which human flourishing is achieved, the right kind of legal order
can be viewed as a necessary precondition for the possibility that
human flourishing can take place in a social context-which, given the
nature of human sociality, is the only place where flourishing can
occur. More importantly, the right kind of legal order is a
precondition for the possibility that everyone's flourishing can take
place.
The neo-Aristotelian account of flourishing primarily addresses the
ethical problem of identifying the good for human beings. But it also
exposes another quite distinct social problem. Human beings need
others to flourish-atomistic individualism is not an option-but, at
the same time, other people can intervene to prevent the self-direction
that constitutes the essential core of human flourishing. Given the
nature of human beings and the nature of human flourishing, how can
society be structured to permit each and every individual to engage in
the sorts of actions that constitute flourishing without favoring the
flourishing of any one person over that of another?
This problem is not the same as the ethical problem of how persons
should live their lives. It is a structural problem that is distinctly
political/legal. Having identified it as a problem, and one that is
distinct from the problems that are answered by ethical theory, we are
now in a position to define a good society. A good society is one in
which this social problem is handled well; in which there exists a
political/legal structure that permits each and every individual to
engage in the sorts of actions that constitute flourishing without
favoring the flourishing of any one person over that of another. And
the means by which this problem is solved, therefore, will provide the
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specific characteristics that determine the extent to which any
particular society is "good."
III. THE GOOD SOCIETY AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY

How then can we solve the problem of flourishing in a social
context? Human flourishing or actualization is an activity that needs
to be performed by each person for him or herself. The precondition
for this activity that everyone shares is the recognition of a jurisdiction
or space within which each person is free to make her own decisions
and exercise her own choices in pursuit of happiness, or the
actualization of her potential. This jurisdiction or space is recognized
to some degree in any society that is functioning at all. The good
society is one that identifies and protects the widest range of selfdirection for each person that is consistent with the same range of selfdirection for all others.
Some will ask why self-direction plays so central a role in providing
a good structure for the Great Society. This is an important question,
and though we do not have the time or space to develop it here, there
are basic answers to this question. Suffice it to say for now that, of all
the generic goods and virtues, self-direction is the only feature of
human flourishing that is common to all acts of human flourishing and
peculiar to each, and yet at the same time does not imply any
particular form of flourishing. It expresses the core of human
flourishing. Its protection is something that everyone in principle can
fulfill regardless of his or her material circumstances, and it is not only
common to, but required by, all forms of human flourishing. Selfdirection, therefore, is that feature of human flourishing that can be
used to solve the political/legal structural problem that we noted
earlier.
The principles that define the moral space or jurisdiction within
which people may exercise self-direction in pursuit of their selfactualization are correctly referred to as natural rights. And given
that these rights secure the liberty to pursue happiness, they can more
particularly be characterized as "liberty rights." These liberty rights
consist of the right of property, freedom of contract, first possession,
self-defense, and restitution.' Together they can be taken as defining
the specific contours of a right to liberty. A good society is, in short,
one in which the right to liberty is effectively protected. For the
protection of liberty, so defined, is the precondition for each and
every person to flourish without preferring the flourishing of any one
person to any other.
7. The claim that the protection of these particular rights is essential for people
to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in society with others is the
principal thesis of Barnett, The Structure of Liberty, supra note 2, at 63-83, 176, 184,
and is defended at length there.
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IV. THE ROLE OF A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION IN A GOOD SOCIETY

Though a good society requires a legal order that effectively
protects the particular rights that define a general right to liberty, we
do not assume that such a legal order must be provided by what we
A polycentric legal order can contain
think of as government.'
multiple legal systems without a hierarchical government to oversee
the interaction of these legal systems.' Though such a legal order
would have a "constitution" in the English sense of being constituted
by a structure and basic principles, it would make little sense for a
polycentric legal order comprised of multiple legal systems to have a
written "constitution"-in the American sense.
If a written constitution is desirable at all, it is only when people in a
particular "civil society" rely upon government to provide protection
of their natural or "civil" rights. In such a context, how does a written
constitution contribute to a good society, so defined? By enabling
government to perform its functions, which include most importantly
the enforcement of laws aimed at protecting the rights of individuals
from their fellow citizens, while at the same time making it more
difficult for government itself to intrude upon these rightful
jurisdictions that are the prerequisite for human flourishing.
Let us assume one has discovered a form of government that can
provide a legal system which protects the rights that are preconditions
of human flourishing from violation by both private persons and by
the government itself. In this event, a written constitution, interpreted
according to its original meaning, can serve to "lock in" that particular
form of government."0 A written constitution, so interpreted, can help
resist deviations from this form of government, deviations that would
endanger the rights that are the preconditions for the achievement of
human flourishing.
Of course, according to the neo-Aristotelian conception of the
good, to flourish, human beings need far more than the protection of
their rights. This does not mean, however, that it is constitutional
government that must, or even can, provide these other things. Man is
a social animal in a variety of ways, and sociality can even be seen as
one of the basic virtues in anyone's basket of primary goods. But
what we require of others can best be, and therefore should be,

8. The terms "government" and "state" are usually considered synonymous. If,
however, the term "government" properly refers to any established legal order, then

there can be "government" without a "state" that claims monopoly on the legitimate
enforcement of law. See Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the
State 291-308 (1990). Nevertheless, in what follows we shall continue to use the term
"government" in the more limited sense of being equivalent to a "state."
9. See Barnett, The Structure of Liberty, supra note 2, at 238-97.
10. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalisinfor Nonoriginalists,45 Loy. L Rev. 611,

629-43 (1999).
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supplied by family, friends and the many genuine communities that
are as diverse as the needs of individuals who seek them out.
V. MUST A CONSTITUTION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY ALSO ENFORCE
WELFARE RIGHTS

At this point, someone is bound to object that the conception of a
constitution for the good society that we have described neglects the
vital function of government in providing for the basic material wellbeing of its people. Or, to speak more plainly, given the fact that
government itself does not produce wealth, it is ultimately a
government's responsibility to take resources from some of its people
so that others may have at least the possibility of flourishing. There is,
of course, much more to be said for and against such a claim than we
can possibly explore now, so let us just identify a few problems with
this claim for welfare rights that are revealed by our account of human
flourishing and the good society.
We can begin with the serious problems of knowledge and interest
that attach to the granting of any such power. The knowledge, for
example, of who does not need as much as some other person, the
resources they have produced, earned or received (without violating
the liberty rights of anyone else) to flourish, as well as what
constitutes "need." There is then the problem of interest that is
created once the legitimacy of a power to take from A and give to B is
recognized. This is the problem of people scrambling to define
themselves out of the category of A's into the category of B's and the
incentives of government officials to manipulate these categories to
best preserve their own power and perquisites. And if the individual
and communal jurisdictions that government ought to protect are
themselves needed to solve pervasive problems of knowledge,
interest, and power, then interfering with these jurisdictions to secure
some other ostensibly good end may well be self-defeating."
Moreover, if flourishing is the good for human beings-and this
good is agent-relative, not impersonal-then on this account there is
no reason to prefer one person's flourishing to that of another. The
only thing a legal order can provide, without running afoul of this
conception of human good, is the social precondition for the
possibility of everyone's flourishing. The "equal protection" of
flourishing for everyone requires that, whatever government does to
protect the jurisdictional spheres of decision making upon which
flourishing depends, it may not favor some or sacrifice others. That is,
it would require a persuasive argument that the government of a good
society is justified in preferring one person's flourishing to another's,
or the power to sacrifice the life of one for either the many or the few.
11. See Barnett, The Structure of Liberty, supra note 2, at 301-28 (discussing
problems with theories of retributive and distributive justice).
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And this argument can find no support in the neo-Aristotelian
conception of the good based on human flourishing that we have
described here.
But does not the protection of the sorts of rights we have discussed
"prefer" one form of flourishing or one group of persons to another?
We do not think so, but this is a complicated issue. 2 What a legal
system that enforces just rules of law provides-namely, the liberty
that protects the possibility of self-direction-is but one of the
necessary conditions that everyone requires to flourish. Such a system
provides the space within which people can be free to make the
choices that only they can make as to how to actualize their unique
potential. It does not, however, provide the sufficient conditions for
flourishing. And this goes as much for those who might require great
material wealth to flourish as it does for those who require very little.
Were it possible for a government to provide the sufficient conditions
for everyone to flourish, then perhaps it would be warranted in doing
so, but we deny that this is ever possible for human beings in our
world or in any conceivable world.
Yet, on second thought, even to consider this utopian supposition
seems to go too far. Human flourishing is, in its essence, an activity
for which the individual alone is responsible, not some condition
others can provide. Moreover, this entire way of approaching politics
and law-namely, thinking of the political/legal order as having as its
aim the achievement of human flourishing-begs some serious
questions. Most importantly, it assumes that the political/legal order
is merely ethics writ large. This ought not to be done. Such an
assumption forgets that human flourishing is highly pluralistic as well
Furthermore, it ignores the distinctly
as profoundly social.
political/legal structural problem we spoke of earlier-namely, how do
we create a political/legal order that will, as a matter of principle, not
require that some form of human flourishing be sacrificed to some
other form.
Knowing either that X-ing is good and ought to be done or that Xing is bad and ought not to be done, does not, by itself, respectively
show either that X-ing should be legally required or legally prohibited.
Indeed, as Aquinas noted, 3 there is a difference between demands of
justice that are morally binding and demands of justice that are
morally and legally binding. What is it, then, if anything, that justifies
12. Murder, theft, rape, extortion, and fraud are legally banned by a political/legal
order based on natural rights. Though there might be some individuals who regard

these activities as forms of human flourishing, they are not. These activities are
incompatible with many of the features of human flourishing, but especially the
generic good of sociality. Furthermore, to the extent that such activities become a
part of "normal" social and cultural practices, then to that extent such societies and
cultures are inimical to the social and pluralistic character of human flourishing.
13. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-I, 23, 3, ad I and II-Il, 80, ad
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moving from the ethical order to the political/legal order? This is, de
jure, the fundamental datum explanandum of political and legal
philosophy, and it is incumbent on any political and legal philosopher
to show what justifies moving from one order to the next.
Collapsing the distinction between the ethical and political/legal
orders only avoids addressing this problem. This is a nonstarter. We
have, however, already addressed this issue by identifying natural
rights as the key to solving a distinctly political/legal structural
problem.14 Natural rights do not show us how to flourish, but they do
provide a way for establishing and maintaining a political/legal order
that will protect the possibility that everyone might flourish in society.
A political/legal order based on the natural right to liberty protects
the possibility of self-direction in a social context. This in turn helps
secure the possibility that individual human beings might flourish in
diverse ways in various cultures and communities without requiring
that the flourishing of any other individual or group be sacrificed. In
other words, it offers the best alternative known to date of reconciling
the highly individual and profoundly social character of human
flourishing.
But still, what about the claim that some minimum amount of
physical resources are also necessary, though not sufficient, for human
flourishing and that the constitution for the good society we are
describing is objectionable because it does not provide for such
resource distribution? In addition to the problems of knowledge and
interest we describe above (which apply to the problem of
determining what this minimum amount of resources might be for
each person and, once legitimating the transfer, keeping it within the
boundary defined by this justification), there is an additional problem.
If taking resources from A to give to B is justified on the grounds
that it is necessary to provide the minimum of resources that are
necessary for B to flourish, how do we know that doing so will not
prevent A from flourishing because it deprives her of those resources
that she needs to flourish? In other words, on what grounds is any
government in a good society warranted in thwarting the flourishing
of some by depriving them of resources they have acquired rightfully
as part of their personal projects, to provide what is arguably the
necessary, but not even sufficient, resources for someone else to
flourish? Our position is that the government of a good society
should protect persons and their property from being used without
their consent. This is the only condition for the possibility of
14. Rasmussen and Den Uyl refer to this as "liberalism's problem." Douglas J.
Den Uyl, Liberalism and Virtue, in Public Morality, Civic Virtue, and the Problem of
Modern Liberalism 82 (T. William Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 2000); Douglas B.
Rasmussen, Community versus Liberty?, in Liberty for the Twenty-First Century:
Contemporary Libertarian Thought 271 (Tibor R. Machan & Douglas B. Rasmussen
eds., 1995).
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flourishing that it may justifiably provide without preferring the
flourishing of one person over that of another.
It is not enough to respond that we can take from some to give to
others without depriving those from whom resources are taken of the
conditions sufficient for their flourishing. This begs, as already noted,
numerous questions. Further, unless the claim is that such takings do
not deprive anyone of the conditions sufficient to flourish, then one is
consciously sacrificing the flourishing of one to provide conditions
necessary but not sufficient for the flourishing of another. This would
not be a "good society" from the standpoint of human flourishing.
Therefore, so long as we agree that no government can, by taking
from A to give to B, provide the conditions that are sufficient for
everyone to flourish, and so long as there is no guarantee that taking
from A to give to B will not deprive A of the resources that are
necessary for her flourishing, then our choice is between a government
that favors the flourishing of one person over another or one that
stays out of the way of both and limits itself to providing that which all
forms of flourishing require: the protection of a right to liberty
comprised of each person's liberty rights to acquire, use, and dispose
of resources in the world without violating the like rights of others.
CONCLUSION

In justifying his veto of the extension of the charter of the Second
National Bank on the grounds that the measure exceeded the
constitutional powers of Congress, President Andrew Jackson
observed that: "[d]istinctions in society will always exist under every
just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can
not be produced by human institutions. '' 5 Yet at the same time
Jackson also insisted that, "[i]n the full enjoyment of the gifts of
Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every
man is equally entitled to protection by law."" A constitution that
provides for this equal protection of the rights retained by the people
is, we think, a proper constitution for a good society.

15. 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 590 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
16. Id
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